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The information technology project control literature has documented that clan control is often essential in
complex multistakeholder projects for project success. However, instituting clan control in such conditions
is challenging as people come to a project with diverse skills and backgrounds. There is often insufficient time
for clan control to develop naturally. This paper investigates the question , "How can clan control be enacted

in complex IT projects? " Recognizing social capital as a resource , we conceptualize a clan as a group with
strong social capital (i.e., where its members have developed their structural, cognitive, and relational ties to
the point that they share common values and beliefs and are committed to a set of peer norms). We theorize
that the enactment of clan control is a dual process of (1) building the clan by developing its social capital
dimensions (structural, cognitive, and relational ties) or reappropriating social capital from elsewhere and
(2) leveraging the clan by reinforcing project-facilitating shared values, beliefs, and norms, and inhibiting
those that impede the achievement of project goals. We explore how clan control was enacted in a large IT
project at a major logistics organization in which clan control was quickly instituted to avoid an impending
project failure. Our research contributes to theory in three ways: (1) we reconcile the two differing views of
clan control into a single framework, (2) we explain the role of controllers in enacting clan control, and (3) we
clarify how formal control can be employed to develop clan control.
Keywords: Behavioral control theory, clan control, formal control, project management, project control, IT
projects, social capital, enterprise systems

Introduction ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■

departments and business units must work hand-in-hand with

internal IT professionals and external vendors. In such proIn complex multistakeholder projects such as organizationjects, stakeholders often do not have prior working relationwide ERP implementations, representatives from ships
various
and must quickly work toward a common goal: the

delivery of systems that meet functional requirements, on
time, within budget, and at acceptable quality. A portfolio of

^ale Goodhue was the accepting senior editor for this paper. Jan Pries-Heje
served as the associate editor.

controls comprising formal and informal controls is needed to
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align the efforts of stakeholders. While prior research

outcomes are unclear and behavior hard to specify (Kirsch

observes that formal control (e.g., project milestones, project

1996). Prior research recognizes the importance of clan

budgets, and systems development methodologies) dominates

control, but has not found it consistently in all projects
(Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997; Wilkins and
Ouchi 1 983). Moreover, it is unclear how clan control relates
to other control modes in a balanced portfolio (Kirsch 1997).

the portfolio, particularly when a vendor is involved (Choud-

hury and Sabherwal 2003), the literature also documents the

need for informal clan control (Kirsch 2004; Kohli and
Kettinger 2004; Perrow 1986). Unlike behavior and outcome
control which rely on the direct application of formal power

or organizational authority to control, clan control draws on
interactions among members of a clan to direct, influence, or

regulate others to achieve project goals. These interactions
are realized in the form of norms, peer sanctions, rituals, and
ceremonies.

As controllers, project managers often have to get controllees

from diverse groups, such as users, consultants, and IT personnel, to work together to deliver the project. Newell et al.

Control is defined as being between a controller and a
controllee (Kirsch 1997). However, while the controller of
formal control is clearly higher in the organizational hierarchy, the controller in clan control is often portrayed as a
peer(Jaworski 1988; Jaworski et al. 1993;Kirsch 1996;Kohli

and Kettinger 2004). This creates tension, as the formal
controller may have goals separate from the clan. Some
suggest this tension requires a trade-off (Cardinal et al. 2004;
Gittell 2000; Sundaramurthy and Lewis 2003), where formal

control is reduced to foster clan control. Others suggest
having more clan and formal control increases the likelihood

of project success (Henderson and Lee 1992; Long et al.
(2004), for example, note that knowledge for complex IT
2002).
projects is often dispersed. Collective knowledge must be
generated through interaction, negotiation, and learning to
Thus, besides elaborating on the concept of clan control, this
achieve shared understanding of organizational processes.
paper
seeks to ascertain how it can be enacted in complex IT
Stakeholders do better work if they share overall group
projects
to increase the likelihood of project success. We use
objectives and adhere to group values and norms. However,
social
capital
as the lens for theorizing about clan control.
stakeholders often come from distinct occupational communities steeped in their individual craft and culture (Van Through this theoretical lens, we clarify and enrich the
Maanen and Barley 1984). Project team members may be conceptualization of clan control, and identify how it can be
working together for the first time, and are usually not a clan
at the start of the project.

The absence of a clan makes clan control unlikely at project
initiation. When project individuals have distinct agendas,
and lack common interests, clan control is difficult to enact

(Ouchi 1979; Wilkins and Ouchi 1983). Also, given tight
project schedules, there is often insufficient time for a clan to

enacted in complex projects. We also explore the role of

controllers in facilitating the enactment of clan control.

The next sections provide an overview of clan control
research before introducing the social capital lens and elaborating on the new insights it brings. Later sections outline our
research methodology, case findings, analysis and discussion,
and our conclusion.

develop in situ through socialization (Wilkins and Ouchi
1983). Hence, instituting clan control is a challenge. The
issue is further complicated by the need to exercise clan con-

trol at project initiation as it is most needed during requirements analysis, when disparate stakeholder groups must work

jointly to arrive at a common design (Kirsch 2004). Moreover, the uncertainty of complex projects makes it difficult to

precisely define outcomes and desired behaviors for the
effective exertion of formal control; prior studies note the

importance of clan control in driving complex projects

Clan Control in IT Projects
Consistent with other modes of control in the IT project con-

trol literature (Eisenhardt 1985, 1988, 1989a; Govindarajan
and Fisher 1990; Kirsch 1996, 1997; Tiwana and Keil 2007),
clan control aims to direct, influence, or regulate others to

achieve project goals. A clan is a culturally homogeneous

Kirsch 1997), the project control literature has noted many IT
projects with insufficient levels of clan control (Choudhury
and Sabherwal 2003; Kirsch 1997).

group where members share common values, beliefs, and
norms (Ouchi and Price 1978). Unlike behavioral and outcome controls which rely on formal power or organizational
authority, clan control draws on peer monitoring and sanctions to promulgate shared values, beliefs, and norms. Clan
control is especially relevant when outcomes are unclear and
behavior is hard to specify (Kirsch 1996, 2004).

The inherently vague concept of clan control is also a problem. Clan control is often "the other control," deployed when

While there is strong consensus on the importance of clan
control, its conceptualization has remained ambiguous in the

(Drummond 1996; Kirsch 2004; Kohli and Kettinger 2004;
McFarlan and Dailey 1999). Despite the widespread recognition of the criticality of clan control (Cardinal et al. 2004;
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literature with "overlaps and inconsistencies across the var-

clan control as actions facilitating the creation of a new clan

ious conceptualizations" (Kirsch 2004, p. 375). One research
stream sees clan control as drawing on shared values, beliefs,
and norms to align behaviors and project goals. This pre-

and as actions drawing on the norms of an existing clan to

supposes the existence of an effective clan. For example, clan

achieve goals. It also provides guidance on the important
practical issue of how to facilitate the enactment of clan
control in managing complex projects.

controls can be seen as actions against deviations from social

norms (Jaworski 1988, Jaworski et al. 1993). Kohli and
Kettinger (2004) suggest clan control arises from adherence

to deep-rooted "common agreement." Clan control thus
leverages on the informal power of an existing clan to align

Social Capital as a Lens for Clan Control

behaviors and project goals. But how such a clan comes into

Social capital2 is the resource associated with networks, and
relationships between people that facilitate cooperation and

existence is generally not discussed.

collective action (Bourdieu 1983; Coleman 1988; Putnam

Others conceptualize clan control as developing and building

1993). Unlike other forms of capital embodied in machines,
objects, or humans, social capital inheres in the relations

a clan through socialization mechanisms. Rowe and Wright's

among actors (Kankanhalli et al. 2005; Newell et al. 2004;

(1997) mechanisms of clan control (e.g., training, socialization) are intended to reduce dissimilarities across individuals

Wasko and Faraj 2005). Members of religious organizations
or recreational clubs, for example, often have strong social

to facilitate clan development. Similarly, Choudhury and

capital (Green and Brock 2005; Putnam 1993). Members

Sabherwal (2003) highlight the need to "promulgate"

within such groups are more willing to exchange favors and

common values, beliefs, and philosophy to build the clan.

help facilitate collective action (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).

Successful deployment of clan control in this concep-

The rich interaction created by social networks also fosters

tualization achieves an effective clan, typically manifested by

strong cooperation among group members. Indeed, some

the emergence of norms that facilitate success in a project or

researchers treat groups with strong social capital and clans

organizational endeavor (Kirsch 1996, 1997; Ouchi 1980).

almost interchangeably (Adler and Kwon 2002; Sturgess

The two conceptualizations of clan control, as leveraging an

2000). This paper is aligned with such research. We define
a clan as a group with strong social capital (i.e., where mem-

existing clan and building a new clan, need to be reconciled.

They also raise questions about how clan control can be

bers develop social ties to the point they share common
beliefs, values, and norms).

enacted in complex IT projects. Leveraging an existing clan
is difficult as the project team, comprising members from the

vendor and diverse user groups, is usually not a clan. Con-

versely, building a clan is a slow and emergent process

A social capital lens suggests that the enactment of clan
control requires the building of social capital among members. Like physical or financial capital, building social capital

(Wilkins and Ouchi 1983). A complex project requires the

requires time and effort. The recognition that social capital

team to become a clan in a short period of time. Hence, both

has structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions (Nahapiet

conceptualizations of clan control pose challenges to the

and Ghoshal 1 998) suggests that building strong social capital

quick enactment of clan control in complex projects.

involves concerted efforts to develop and enhance structural,

We address this problem by applying a social capital lens to

cognitive, and relational ties among members, which in turn
leads to shared norms, beliefs, and values.

the concept of clan control. Such a lens is appropriate as both

clan control and social capital focus on social relationships

and deploying socialization mechanisms. Social capital is

Structural ties provide channels for interaction, allowing
behaviors, beliefs, or values to be transmitted to others and

linked to clan control as it is often deployed purposefully with

perpetuated. Cognitive ties provide a common language and

a hint of control orientation. Social capital provides a basis
for facilitating coordinated actions (Putnam 1993) and makes
"possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be

perspective to communicate and interpret norms, beliefs, and

attainable in its absence" (Coleman 1990, p. 202). Recent

2More specifically, our conceptualization of social capital is internal,

studies have drawn strong parallels between clan control and

"bonding" at the project group level, unlike Adler and Kwon' s (2002) con-

social capital (Kirsch et al. 2010).

cept of external social capital that refers to members' relational connected-

ness outside the group, "bridging." Many complex IT project teams are

This paper views clans as groups with high social capital.
This perspective provides a clearer conceptualization of clan
control that reconciles the apparently inconsistent views of

cross-functional in nature. Teams are assembled with members who are

experts or potential brokers to needed expertise, knowledge, or resources.
The focus of our paper is on the challenge of bringing together these people

from diverse backgrounds.
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values. Relational ties strengthen trust which promotes com-

argue that high performing teams go through the phases of

mitment to group norms, values, and beliefs. The structural,

orientation, trust building, goal clarification, commitment, and

cognitive, and relational dimensions of social capital are

implementation. Finally, Jones (2008) argues that teams

highly interrelated and mutually reinforcing (Nahapiet and

involved in enterprise systems must be built, equalized, struc-

Ghoshal 1998); developing one dimension strengthens others.

tured, and then tweaked.

The network of structural, cognitive, and relational ties not

only leads to the emergence of clan norms, values, and

In all three team building models, social capital within the

beliefs, but also enables these to be enforced through peer

team is first developed, before the team is "guided" to

monitoring and rewards/sanctions (Barron and Gjerde 1997;
Erez et al. 2002; Feller et al. 2008; Horné 2009; Kandel and

perform its task. Tuckman' s model begins with individual-

Lazear 1992; Lave and Wenger 1991; Sewell 1998;
Williamson 1983, 1985).

conflict resolution in the storming stage. It is only in the

istic team members at the forming stage who engage in

norming stage that team members begin adjusting to each
others' behavior, and in the performing stage that the team
The successful building of a clan and the corresponding emer- can be trusted to achieve project goals. Similarly, in Drexler
gence of shared beliefs, values, and norms does not imply et al. 's model, social capital must be built by establishing
clan control. Like human capital possessed by the clan, themeaning via trust building through orientation and relationclan's social capital may lie idle, be underutilized, or even beships. It is only then that one can clarify goals and commit
misused (Bicchieri 2006; Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). Forthe team to implementation. Finally, in Jones' model, social
example, a clan could evolve a norm of leaving a workplacecapital must be built, and power differences between members
early, or a norm where problems are suppressed. The con- must be equalized, before social capital can be used.
troller must "guide" and channel social capital in the clan so
shared beliefs, values, and norms helpful to a project are
retained and reinforced, while norms that impede the projectEnacting Clan Control: Building the Clan

are inhibited.

Social capital is conceptualized as comprising three highly

Viewing clans as groups with high social capital helpsrelated dimensions (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998):

reconcile the two views of clan control. Enacting clan control
consists of two distinct but interdependent processes of• Structural : The structural dimension relates to overall

building the clan and leveraging the clan. Each process is

patterns of connections among actors within a social
network (i.e., who someone knows) and how the network
of contacts is arranged. When networks are dense with

insufficient for effective clan control. Viewing the enactment
of clan control only as the building of a clan is not sufficient

as shared values, beliefs, and norms that emerge may not

a large proportion of strong and direct ties between

contribute to project goals. Viewing the enactment of clan

members, social capital is high. The structural dimension

control as leveraging the clan is similarly incomplete as it preenforcement of shared norms. Such a clan cannot be assumed

refers not only to existing ties (Granovetter 1973) and
linkage configurations, but also includes physical structures that encourage or inhibit ties (Perrow 1986). For

in many large, newly formed project teams.3

example, locations of congregational areas often influ-

supposes the existence of a clan to ensure the effective peer

ence who one has ties with (Ko et al. 2005) and may
The conceptualization of clan control as a dual process is

affect the development of social capital.

furthermore supported by process theories of team building

(Kozlowski and Ilgen 2006). Tuckman (1965) proposes that
all teams go through four phases of development: forming,
storming, norming, and performing. Drexler et al. (1988)

3The conceptualization of clan control as the dual process of building social
capital and leveraging norms applies equally to an experienced project team

that is already a clan. First, like all other sources of capital, one must
continuously invest in social capital for it to be productive. As much as one

must maintain a machine, one must continually build structures, shared
language, and relationships. Second, projects are by their nature, unique.
The entire set of norms beneficial for one project is unlikely to be wholly
applicable to another. The controller must guide and adapt the clan to a new
project environment.

• Cognitive: The cognitive dimension refers to commonalities among individuals that provide shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning (e.g.,
common language or narratives) (Nahapiet and Ghoshal
1998). For example, IT workers adopt words with particular meanings like "bug," and RTFM. These provide
a common vocabulary to discuss IT issues, and separate
IT workers from other professionals.
Relational : The relational dimension refers to the "close-

ness" between members of a group. It goes beyond
traditional team bonding activities like dinners, and
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soccer games. Coleman (1988) argues for the importance

In clans, values, beliefs, and norms are enforced through peer

of "multiplex" linkages - relationships where individuals

monitoring and peer sanction/reward (Arnott and Stiglitz

share more than one context, for example, where project

1991; Barron and Gjerde 1997; Kandel and Lazear 1992;
Kirsch 1997; Lave and Wenger 1991; Sewell 1998; Towry

members are simultaneously friends or neighbors.

2003). A clan can be proactively leveraged to focus on proThe social capital perspective thus recognizes that beyond
informal socialization mechanisms, structural and cognitive
dimensions must be instituted to build the clan. For example,
the structural dimension of social capital may be developed

ject outcomes by influencing clan norms, values, and beliefs

through thoughtful design of project reporting structures and

Project-facilitating shared beliefs, values, or norms in the clan

and interfering with the clan's monitoring and reward/
sanction mechanisms.

work groups, as well as through the collocation of team mem-

may be reinforced in several ways. A controller could

bers (Coleman 1988). In NIBCO's enterprise system implementation, the work area was specifically designed to have no
closed doors or private offices (Brown and Vessey 2001) to

reframe or rearticulate the goals and vision of a project to

facilitate the building of structural ties. Cognitive ties may be

developed through training that leads team members to view
a project through a common methodological framework that

emphasizes project deliverables (Rowe and Wright 1997).

appeal to existing beliefs or values built up in the clan (Kotter

1996; Kotter and Cohen 2002), and demonstrate that the
clan's shared goals would be fulfilled by striving toward
project goals. Such alignment helps group members internalize project goals quickly and act consistently to achieve
project outcomes. These actions are often reflected in strategic statements embracing such goals (e.g., memorandums of

Moreover, one can accelerate the building of clan by

understanding, carefully crafted project vision and mission).

reappropriating social capital from another context. Like

Project- facilitating shared beliefs, values, and norms can be

other capital, social capital may be developed as an invest-

further reinforced by making them visible to the clan. Peer

ment for the future. In the same way, social capital required

monitoring serves a dual purpose of monitoring for enforce-

today need not be built from scratch. Bourdieu (1983) notes

ment, and monitoring for learning (Arnott and Stiglitz 1991;

that social capital is "convertible." Coleman ( 1 988), similarly,

Barron and Gjerde 1997; Bicchieri 2006; Lave and Wenger

discusses the "appropriable" social organization. Structural,

1991; Wenger 1998). Norms, values, and beliefs can be

cognitive, and relational ties may be reappropriated from one

propagated via peers who mimic the individuals they monitor

social setting to another (Arregle et al. 2007; Bolino et al.

(Bicchieri 2006; Whiten et al. 2007). For example, a con-

2002; Huntoon 2001). Such reappropriation of social capital

troller can reinforce project-facilitating beliefs, values, and

is seen, for example, when a recruited executive brings a

norms by appointing respected or central individuals in the

trusted management team from an old to a new organization.

clan (e.g., opinion leaders) who support these beliefs, values,
and norms to formal project team positions (Lave and Wenger

1991; Wenger 1998).

Enacting Clan Control: Leveraging the Clan

Leveraging the clan also involves inhibiting shared beliefs,

Like any capital, embedded social capital is only rendered
productive when applied to specific problem domains, for

values, or norms that impede project goals. Individuals mani-

example, to reduce individuals' capacity for agency behavior

isolated, reducing their access to project members and, hence,

festing or propagating such beliefs, values, or norms can be

(Fowler and Etchegary 2008; Nooteboom 2007; Oh et al.

their influence in the clan (Feller et al. 2008; Lave and

2006; Tansley and Newell 2007) or to facilitate coordination

Wenger 1991). Punitive actions such as moving individual

and knowledge sharing (Fowler and Etchegary 2008; Wasko
and Faraj 2005).

members to the periphery and public depreciating or shaming

can suppress or discourage project-restraining beliefs, values,

or norms (Jaworski 1988; Jaworski et al. 1993).
However, the literature has generally been silent about how a

clan can be leveraged for specific outcomes. In the main,
there is an implicit assumption that a clan's shared beliefs,

The lens of social capital is thus useful in revealing conceptual insights on the enactment of clan control as a dual

values, and norms will automatically be aligned toward

process of building and leveraging the clan. Unlike our tradi-

project goals. Extending the logic of leveraging, we suggest

tional understanding of clan control that narrowly emphasizes

two ways a clan can be steered more proactively: (1) by

informal socialization to develop clan and expects clans to

reinforcing project- facilitating shared beliefs, values, and
norms, and (2) by inhibiting beliefs, values, and norms that
impede the achievement of project goals.

emerge slowly, organically, and often unpredictably overtime

(Ouchi 1979; Wilkins and Ouchi 1983), the social capital lens
injects pragmatism. It suggests the possibility of active facili-

MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2/June 2012 581

This content downloaded from 131.151.26.87 on Thu, 15 Aug 2019 13:05:32 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Chua et al./Enacting Clan Control in Complex IT Projects

tation in shaping and developing the structural, cognitive, and

cesses to be implemented in a single enterprise package for

relational ties in social relationships and does not preclude the

the three BUs.

use of more expedient formal mechanisms to do so. Indeed,
some (e.g., Evans 1996) argue formal authority or hierarchy
can enable the building of social capital by providing "integ-

The organization had never undertaken such an initiative
before. The required knowledge and skills were distributed

rity" to the socialization process. Others suggest that formal

across BU representatives and vendor consultants. Clan

authority is necessary for building social capital (Boss 2000).

control was needed to facilitate cooperation and knowledge
exchange.

The use of formal mechanisms gives assurance that expected
norms and reciprocity will be enforced and free riding will be

kept in check. Extending the social capital perspective to the

Second, there was low social capital among team members at

concept of clan control suggests that controllers may

project initiation. The BUs had traditionally been autono-

influence the enactment of clan control toward project goals.

mous. The initial vendor consultants also had not worked

with the organization previously. In addition, because the
The following sections empirically examine these concepts.

We explore a longitudinal case, a complex IT project which
began with little clan control and was clearly foundering

vendor was building up its manpower in the region, many
consultants were new. Third, we had comprehensive access

to project participants and documentation from project

before steps were taken to increase clan control and bring the

inception, which enabled us to observe how clan control was

project back on track.

enacted.

Research Methodology
Our research question of how clan control can be enacted in
IT projects led to an exploratory longitudinal case study, a
methodology considered appropriate for how, why, and what

questions (Dubé and Paré 2003; Paré 2004). The longitudinal
case study approach provided two key advantages. First, it
allowed us to acquire a deep contextual understanding of the
project that methodologies such as surveys do not provide
(Yin 2003). Second, it allowed us to observe developments
as project events unfolded, instead of relying on retrospective

accounts (Dubé and Paré 2003). These advantages provided
rich details about, and surfaced insights on the enactment of,

clan control (Dyer and Wilkins 1991).

Site Description
The company focuses on logistics (moving cargo across
locations) and has three principal BUs, each dedicated to a
particular transport mode: (1) air, (2) land, and (3) sea. The
air BU operates a large fleet that includes jet, propeller, and
rotor aircraft, and maintains facilities around the world to
support them. The land BU specializes in off-road transport
and supply, but also operates vehicles for passenger and cargo

transport on traditional roadways. The sea BU maintains
vessels capable of navigation in both coastal and deep waters.

The new system was to replace aging logistics management
systems in the BUs, as well as integrate their logistics pro-

cesses. Previously, each BU operated its own individual
logistics management system. The company wanted to more

closely integrate its logistics processes, comprising engineering and maintenance, supply management, and logisticsrelated finance, both across and within the BUs.
Our case sampling strategy involved intensity sampling (Paré
2004), the selection of a case exemplifying the phenomenon
The project had three principal stakeholder groups.
being studied (clan control) (Dubé and Paré 2003). The case
had several characteristics that fitted our research •question.
Corporate management, whose representatives - the corCase Selection

porate vice president (VP), assistant vice president
First, there was a clear need for clan control. This was(A
partiVP) of logistics, and the corporate IT director - were
cularly true of the analysis and design phase where the
the task
controllers responsible for ensuring that the project
was more unstructured and novel, and outcome and behavmet organizational objectives. Positioning the three

ioral controls alone would not have been adequate.senior-most
This
project representatives, who had the highest
research examined the 14-months-long analysis and design
project authority, as controllers is consistent with the
phase of an enterprise package implementation across prior
threeIT literature (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch
highly autonomous business units (BUs) of a logistics2004;
comMahaney and Lederer 2003; Mähring 2002;
pany. The project team designed a set of standardized
pro- and Subramani 2003/2004). Controllers were
Nidumolu
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supported by staff from the corporate office and IT divi-

We visited the site every six weeks, from project inception in

sion that facilitated meetings, liaised with vendors and

January 2003 to the end of the analysis and design phase in
April 2004. We continued to visit the site regularly to April
2005, when the system was successfully implemented in the

BU representatives, created project management docu-

ments, took minutes, and performed other support
functions.

• The vendors (comprising managers and consultants from
the primary vendor and subcontractor) were responsible
for the design and implementation of the enterprise
system. The vendors had about 50 employees on site.

• BU representatives (from the three BUs), who were
subject matter experts, provided input to the requirements

and design, and accepted the resultant standardized
design. The BUs had about 50 employees on site.
Figure 1 presents an organizational chart depicting the various

stakeholders and their formal relationships as controllers

(corporate management) and controllees (i.e., user representatives and vendor consultants).

Data Collection

first BU.

We developed an interview protocol and adapted it to reflect
changes in issues as the project progressed. Prior to the inter-

view, we reviewed the most recent project documentation and

prior interviews, and discussed issues we needed to raise with

interviewees. Interview questions focused on issues of pro-

ject management. In the initial interviews, interviewees were

asked about their role in the project, the tasks in which they
were involved, and the deliverables for which they were
responsible. We asked interviewees to recount their specific
experiences in the project, focusing on problems, issues, how

they or others interacted, and steps taken to resolve problems.

We then asked for interviewees' perceptions of project success and project control. We closed interviews by asking for

recommendations for additional interview subjects. Such
snowball sampling is typical in exploratory research (Kuzel
1992).
We conducted 79 interviews. Table 1 summarizes the

breakdown of interviews.

We were invited by the corporate IT division to observe the
project and develop case reports for the internal training
of
Most interviews
were at least an hour long. During interproject managers. Consistent with case study best practices,
views, at least two, and more commonly three, researchers
we obtained data from multiple sources (Eisenhardt
1989b;
were
on hand to take notes. Interviewers adopted a specialParé 2004; Yin 2003) such as written project documentation
ized role strategy (Dubé and Paré 2003; Eisenhardt 1989b).

including contracts, milestone review presentations
and
One interviewer
was the primary interviewer, who asked the
minutes of meetings, and interviews with project participants.
majority of questions, took fewer notes, and focused on main-
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Stakeholder # of Interviews # of Distinct Interviewees

Corporate Management 18* 3
VP

Logistics

AVP

4

Logistics

Corporate

IT

1

7

Director

1

1

1

1

Corporate Support Staff 18 10

Logistics

IT

Sea

BU

~

12

6

Representatives

7

7

3

4

Land BU Representatives 2 2

Air BU Representatives 5 3
Primary

vendor

16

13

Manager
Consultants

Subcontractor

4
12

13

Manager

6

6

Consultants
Total

*The

79

2
11

7

1
5

41

number

of

inte

ducted with two or more controllers.

taining eye contact with interviewees. The other two inter- principally over the next three months. It was evident during

viewers attempted to take verbatim notes. A tape recorderthe last six months (resolution) that the problems were being
was not used, as interviewees were more comfortable withoutresolved, as improvements to performance were clearly
one. To ensure interview quality was not compromised by observable.
fatigue, no more than three interviews were conducted per
day. Interview notes from all researchers were consolidated These project phases, key events and actions, and perfor-

and typed within 24 hours by a researcher present at the mance, were validated through a detailed, 70-page case submitted to the organization. Multiple individuals provided
(e.g., physical office arrangement, informal notices pasted detailed comments which we incorporated into findings (Dubé
and Paré 2003; Mason 1996).
along hallway) (Paré 2004).

interview. Field notes were also taken to record observations

We were initially interested in identifying the control port-

Analysis

folio in this complex project and how it evolved over time.
We therefore sought to code control mechanisms used, and
We first sought to build an overall understanding of the case. classify them by control modes based on previous classiWe created a sequential time line of major activities, issues, fications in the literature. We regularly discussed and refined
and actions taken by corporate managers, consultants, and BUcoding, paying special attention to how evidence fitted into
representatives, and the project performance at each phase ofthe overall project context (Miles and Huberman 1994). The
three members involved in fieldwork drew on our under-

the project.

standing of the project in discussing coding, while the fourth

The time line was structured in the form of the challenge, team member provided an independent perspective to
tactics, and resolution phases suggested by Paré (2004). The challenge possible coding biases (Adler and Adler 1988).
challenge phase occurred during the first five months, where

problems quickly surfaced, the project foundered, and the Our initial findings revealed that a number of controls were
primary vendor's senior manager abruptly left. Tactics to added in the "tactics" phase. This led us to characterize the
address challenges, mainly by enacting clan control, occurred set of controls that were implemented at the start of the

584 MIS Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 2/June 2012

This content downloaded from 131.151.26.87 on Thu, 15 Aug 2019 13:05:32 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Chua et al. /En acting Clan Control in Complex IT Projects

project as the initial portfolio of controls, and the set that
included the additional controls as the revamped portfolio of
controls. We also discovered that the revamped portfolio of
controls employed substantially more clan control. We found
this significant, and began to explore in greater detail how
clan control was developed in the complex project.

We theorized that controllers leveraged the clan by reinforcing or inhibiting shared norms, values, and beliefs and
reflected this in our coding guidelines. This required us to
identify clan norms and values that emerged as social capital
was developed. As they were more difficult to identify (being

omnipresent and largely invisible), we looked for changes in

group behaviors aligned with the achievement of project
At this point, we shared our preliminary findings at a research

outcomes, before and after actions by controllers to build the

workshop, where participants noted that social capital theory

clan. One example is the change in behavior away from the

might be useful for exploring clan control. We found that,

BU-centric perspective toward an enterprise perspective. Our

indeed, the structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions of

interviews during the challenge phase and site observations

social capital were helpful in interpreting data. Furthermore,

surfaced comments about BU-centric behaviors. Interviews

when we combined social capital theory with our under-

while mechanisms that relied on the existence of norms,

and observations during the resolution phase showed project
team members were changing behavior, as noted in their
greater willingness to accommodate each other. For example,
BU representatives were now more concerned about meeting
project requirements than focusing only on the requirements
of their BU (e.g., " nobody defends his own users We iden-

values, and beliefs of the group were leveraging the clan.

tified a number of controller actions that reinforced this new

standing of the two research streams on clan control (building

the clan and leveraging the clan), we realized that mechanisms that developed structural, cognitive, and relational ties
among project team members contributed to building the clan,

clan norm (see Table 4).
We developed coding guidelines for building social capital
based on definitions of structural, cognitive, and relational
dimensions in the social capital literature (see Table 2), and

Project performance throughout the three phases was also

recoded data. Actions that build structural ties facilitate team

interim and final deliverables, achieved deadlines and objec-

assessed. Concrete evidence was gathered in the form of

members knowing each other. For example, the vendor pro- tives, actual and budgeted figures, and interviewees' percep-

posed the expansion of communal workspace and having tions of the quality of the analysis and design. For example,
consultants and BU representatives sit together. We also con- evidence of poor interim project performance was noted as

sidered whom interview subjects knew, the underlying interviewees talked about missing interim deliverables and
structure that made them meet, interact, and communicate

their perception of problems (e.g., lack of communication

with one another (e.g., accountability structure, task grouping, between certain parties, inability to come to agreement on

and physical layout). For cognitive ties, we considered the

processes).

extent various stakeholders (corporate management, BUs, and
vendor consultants) were different or similar in terms of their

profiles and perspectives. We checked whether stakeholders

had prior related or common experiences (e.g., consultants

Results

who previously worked in the logistics industry, BU represen-

tatives who previously worked on process standardization

This section details the case using the challenge, tactic, and
resolution structure suggested by Paré (2004). In challenge,
ality in experiences and world view. For example, controllers we highlight problems associated with the project team and
wanted all team members to use a common process modeling poor project performance. In tactics, we analyze steps taken
approach and access a common project database. Actions to to create structural, cognitive, and relational ties among team

projects). Actions that build cognitive ties improve common-

build relational ties increase the breadth and depth of members that facilitated the building of the clan in the project.
interaction. We looked for evidence of informal socialization

and bonding activities outside the work context. For example,
the AVP Logistics held karaoke sessions after work.

We then describe how the clan's emergent shared beliefs,
values, and norms were leveraged to achieve project goals. In

resolution, we describe how the project was completed
successfully.

The dimensions of social capital are not orthogonal (Nahapiet
and Ghoshal 1998). An action that builds structural ties may
also support the building of cognitive and relational ties. In

Challenge: Poor Project Performance

presenting actions for building social capital, we only high-

light the mechanisms most directly related to a specific

Initially, management relied on a portfolio of controls heavily

dimension for ease of explication.

weighted toward formal control. Behavior control mecha-
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Coded Construct Observation Illustrative Quote

Build structural Action by controller which helps peop
ties across stakeholder groups to see, seconded to [vendor] to handle [confidential] items and
interact or develop a shared context after implementation , to do the Application Maintenance"

with each other (vendor consultant in commenting on controller's action).
Build cognitive ties Action by controller which creates Build Core "Backbone" Scenarios: "Users have quite
common representations, similar ideas on what backbone scenarios are" (corporate
interpretations, and systems of shared support).
meaning across stakeholder groups

Build relational Action by controller which creates Build Relationship: "Management of relationships with all
ties bonds across stakeholder groups parties , especially with complex projects like this where
scope management is important" (vendor consultant in
stressing what the controller had done right).

Reappropriating Action by controller to reappropriate Bring in Subcontractor Consultants: "[Subcontractor] has
existing social social capital from another context done more than you were supposed to do for this [project].
capital You guys were only supposed to shadow the [requirements

phase], but you took on project leads , scenar

leads. . .. Without this bunch of people, the pro

have turned around and come to this stage" (m
meeting where VP publicly thanked contracto

Reinforcing norms Action by controller to encourage Joint Accountability

specific group behaviors (traceable to owners, 1 user, 1 consultant...
shared norms, beliefs, or values) which we tell both to get it done" (p
help project to succeed

Inhibiting norms Action by controller to discourage group Strict Enforcement o
behaviors (traceable to shared norms, points to emphasize... 2) manag
beliefs, or values) which are hindering local design deliverables and p

project off' (minutes of meeting emphasizing that corporate

management wanted users to sign off by deadline and n
dispute the design).

Emergent Clan Observed by the change in the Being "One Team": "There's ownership... also the people
Norms, Values behaviors of project group members on the ground are working together has helped things too. "
and Beliefs that show the development of shared (corporate IT director)
norms, beliefs, or values, that are
aligned with the achievement of project
outcomes.

Project Indications that the project is successful Process Standardization Target: "in [process modeling
Performance in terms of deliverables, budget, time database], 90% is the same, but adding the out of scope
line, and expected business outcomes scenarios will mean a lower figure" (subcontractor
manager).

nanisms included a standard development methodology, docu-

tual; its intent was to promote a strategic partnership between

mentation procedures, and quality assurance audits; outcome
control mechanisms included specification of project deliver-

mony attended by senior representatives from all stakeholder

ables, budget, time line, and a 60 percent target level of standardization. Few clan control mechanisms were observed

emphasizing the importance of the project to the company's

the two organizations. Another was the project kick-off cere-

groups, where the CEO of the company made a speech

long-term competitiveness. As we explain in the discussion
during the challenge phase. One was an informal memoransection, these initiatives in leveraging the clan were predum of understanding signed between the logistics organizamature, as they incorrectly presumed the existence of a clan.
tion and the primary vendor. This document was noncontrac-
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There was little social capital. Structurally and relationally,

This difference in beliefs about what the key goal of the pro-

representatives from the three BUs did not know each other.

ject should be was reflected in BU representatives' behaviors.

The consultants from the primary vendor also had not worked

The BUs often could not reconcile their conflicting business

with the organization before. The physical layout of the

processes, and would "agree to disagree." Consultants com-

project site was such that each stakeholder group had its own

plained about this conflict among representatives from

room, and there was little interaction except in formal forums

different BUs:

such as requirements meetings. Cognitively, the three BUs
operated autonomously and evolved distinctive norms and

identities. This was reinforced by the norm of each BU
having uniforms of a different color. They also dealt with
different types of logistics equipment, and used separate

If you satisfy any one [BU's] requirements , there
are problems with the other [BUs].
Hence, despite the many formal control mechanisms, the pro-

logistics terms. Air BU personnel were better educated and
more concerned about aircraft reliability. The land BU was

ject quickly foundered. The team struggled with incompatible

more concerned about supply, and having simpler, robust
processes given their larger number of personnel and high
turnover. There was also little shared cognition with vendor
consultants. The vendor, while well-established internation-

each other, and the relationship between BU representatives

ally, had just set up its Asian consulting arm, which recruited

requirements. BU representatives had trouble agreeing with

and the primary vendor was strained. Vendor consultants
were frustrated as BU representatives could not arrive at a
single set of requirements, while BU representatives castigated vendor consultants for being unable to provide best
practices. Thirteen vendor consultants left after the initial

new consultants globally for the project. Consultants were
conversant with the technology, but some were unfamiliar
with the Asian context, the business practices in the logistics

months. The first few milestones were missed. Deliverables

industry, or the client organization's culture and work

formed to audit the interim deliverables, found other problems

practices. A consultant noted that

such as poor integration in the design across functional areas.

There were language problems. The consultants are

were poor and inconsistent. A senior cross-functional team,

In the midst of these problems, the original primary vendor

from around the world, so we have different writing

manager abruptly left, alerting controllers to the severity of

styles and focus. This made synchronization difficult. Some follow the work norms in their home

problems and the need to take drastic action to develop tighter

countries. They take time to adjust their pace of
work here.

cohesion among BU representatives and vendor consultants.
Over the next three months, a slew of management actions

were introduced, leading to the quick enactment of clan
control, and the project began to turn around.

There were differences in norms, values, and beliefs across
stakeholders. For example, BU members and consultants held
different norms and beliefs about each other's roles, and the

level of collaboration expected in the project. BU members
stated that it was the consultants' job to come up with the
design, and this was displayed by their behavior: they drew
boundaries between what they perceived was their work and

Tactic: Building the Clan
Table 3 summarizes various actions taken to build the clan by
developing its social capital dimensions (structural, cognitive,
and relational ties) and reappropriating existing social capital.

what they felt was consultants' work. Consultants expected
BU members to be more proactive in providing inputs to the

design.

Building Structural Ties

Work organization reoriented around scenarios instead of
tracks: Initially, team members were focused on one of three
regarding the goals of the project. Corporate management
tracks
and consultants saw standardization of BU processes and
data - financial control, engineering management, and
supply management - and " there was no forum to discuss
as a key project objective. BU representatives were generally
cross-track issues " (corporate support). In addition, each BU
skeptical about this goal, as they looked at the project more
favored a track. The air BU was most invested in engineering
from the perspective of their respective BUs.

There were also differences in the values and beliefs

management, because aircraft components like engines

Instead of simple harmonization, they [corporate] required extensive engineering maintenance. The land BU
want to do standardization. I see this as overkill !
closely watched supply management, because land vehicles
are
supplied irregularly at multiple sites such as gas stations.
We only need to do so if the benefits exist.
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Building the Clan Actions Taken
Building Structural Ties • Work organization reoriented around scenarios instead of tracks
Seating structure changed
Communal eating facilities introduced

Building Cognitive Ties • New vendor project manager who appreciated and understood local context
recruited

Common modeling language introduced

Building Relational Ties • New vendor project manager carpooled with corporate project manager (i.e.,
AVP Logistics)
Issue airing workshops introduced
Socialization functions such as soccer games, karaoke, and dinners introduced
Management demonstrated solidarity by banning own long vacation leave

Reappropriating Social Capital • Import of social capital through a bigger team of subcontractor consultants

Airplanes and ships, on the other hand, are provided supplies sites with a collocated large project team to show how col-

at fixed ports on a prearranged basis. The track structure

location helped projects move forward. The AVP Logistics

encouraged BU representatives to affiliate with their own BU.

then authorized extensive renovations to the office environ-

The separation of tracks into individual rooms also inhibited

ment. Rooms were refurbished and, more importantly, walls

cross-track interaction and information sharing.

separating various rooms were knocked down; stakeholders
from different groups were required to work together in the

Taking a suggestion from the new primary vendor manager, same open office.

the AVP Logistics reconfigured the project work structure.

Business processes from the tracks were combined into

I recommended all tracks to be in one big room. I

scenarios such that each scenario detailed a situation from

wanted to change peoples ' thinking that they belong

inception to completion. Scenarios were overlaid on the
existing track structure. An example scenario might involve

to just one track and soften team boundaries.
Actually I would like to see everyone as one big

a vehicle breakdown. To correctly model the repair process

resource pool. (Primary Vendor Manager)

end-to-end, the team would have to learn the processes for
supply management (for parts to replace defects), financial Furthermore, seating in the refurbished office was reassigned.
control (for money to obtain parts), and engineering manage-The BU representatives and vendor consultants responsible

ment (to perform the replacement). The scenario structure for each scenario were assigned seats next to each other. As
brought members from different tracks together. Becausescenarios were cross-track, this meant BU representatives

user representatives had to gather requirements for thefrom the different BUs were dispersed, rather than aggrescenario, which crossed functional tracks and BUs, they hadgating in different sections of a single room.
to interact with other stakeholders and understand their issues.

Engineering management, for example, could not just resolveCommunal eating facilities introduced: The project work-

issues specific to the track and ignore problems in other place was a remote building in a difficult-to-access location.
Initial structural design focused on creating office space to
house different stakeholder groups. There was no conscious
The scenario approach helped to resolve cross-track
design of communal or congregational space. For example,
issues , since scenarios go across tracks. Scenarios
there were no food outlets. Workers either packed food from

tracks.

can be used to break barriers between tracks and fill

home or left the facility to eat. This meant workers tended to

in the gaps/black boxes in the processes. (User

eat with preestablished cliques. The AVP Logistics made
proactive arrangements to create congregational spaces

Representative)

centered around food. For example, a mobile food van was
Seating structure changed: Initially, each track was housed invited in at lunchtime. Arrangements were also made for a
in a different room. The primary vendor manager felt tracks nearby office to open its cafeteria to project team members.
should sit together. The subcontractor agreed, and arranged The provision of accessible communal food areas increased
for the AVP Logistics to visit one of the subcontractor's other interaction and recognition among individuals across tracks.
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As a result, BU representatives and vendor consultants across

with. The choice of this new, unfamiliar notation and tool

tracks began seeing more of each other and got to know more

was made despite the presence of viable alternatives. For
example, corporate management could have insisted that

team members. A user representative noted that knowing
more people " really helped with the dialogues and discussions.

supply management adopt the tool and notation employed by
the other two tracks. Adoption was initially painful as every-

one had to be trained on the new tool. However, a single

Building Cognitive Ties
New vendor project manager who appreciated and understood local context recruited: The sudden resignation of the
primary vendor manager provided an opportunity for cor-

porate management to realign social dynamics within the
project team. Learning from its earlier experience, corporate

process modeling tool provided a common language through

which project team members would interact henceforth.
Team members attended training sessions hosted by the tool
vendor, and learned to use the tool vendor's process terms at

those sessions. Furthermore, everyone could refer to a common modeling database to see how each process would relate
to processes in other tracks. People could check the progress

of scenarios across the project in a consistent manner as the
management realized the importance of a vendor manager
project took shape. The new tool also put everyone on equal
who appreciated the company's organizational, industry, and

country contexts. Unlike the earlier appointment, this
screening and interview process was conducted by both the

footing, as most project team members (including consultants)

had no experience with the tool.

vendor and corporate management, who emphasized "ability
to fit" in the hiring interview.

I interviewed [new primary vendor project
manager] for two or three hours to make sure that

he is the right fit. I'm confident. He has relevant
experience , plus strong local ties. He 's married to
a local and has been living here for 15 years. (A VP

Logistics)

Building Relational Ties
New vendor project manager carpooled with A VP Logistics: The new vendor project manager happened to reside in

the same neighborhood as the AVP Logistics. The AVP
Logistics took the opportunity to "multiplex" their relation-

ship as colleagues and neighbors by offering to carpool. The

two men came to work together in the AVP Logistics' car

Common modeling language introduced: One source of
dispute across BUs was the choice of process modeling
notation they should use. Initially, the supply management

track (dominated by the land BU) insisted on a process
modeling notation optimized for supply chain management.

The other tracks wanted a more generic notation. Work on
the supply management track was initiated in the specialized
notation, while work in the other tracks was done in the more

generic one. This inconsistent use of modeling notation led
to frustration as processes done in the supply management

every morning. Such informal communication channels
enabled them to know each other better, and encouraged an
open and friendly discussion of various issues that arose in the

project.
The 30-minute or so drive was good. We talked ' we
chatted, and before we reached the project site, we
would often strategize and decide what were the key

things we needed to resolve today. (AVP Logistics)

track could not be readily integrated with the other two tracks.

Issue airing workshops introduced: Relational barriers, for

I know both notations and know they can 't be used

Ouchi 1983), were also removed. To address initial mistrust,

together , but [land B.U.J insisted on using the
[specialized notation] on supply, while the other
[BUs] went ahead to use the [generic notation].
[Old primary vendor project manager] didn't
object. He gave in to the [BUs]. It led to subsequent problems. There's no integration between
supply and the rest. (Corporate Support)

example, perceived inequity among members (Wilkins and
the subcontractor, with the agreement of the AVP Logistics
and the primary vendor, organized "grievance airing" workshops. Stakeholders from various groups could come to these

workshops to express concerns. Corporate management
supported workshops by their active participation, and by

signaling that concerns would be taken seriously and
addressed. Issues from workshops were put on paper and
mounted on the wall. As solutions were identified, they were

On the advice of the new primary vendor manager, corporate

put on paper next to the issues. Rectified issues were marked.

management mandated the adoption of a new single process

Once all issues on the displayed paper were rectified, the
paper was removed.

modeling notation that project members were not familiar
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[Subcontractor] was subcontracted for the build

We had team workshops for all levels , including
management, team leads , [BU personnel] . It was
very open. It showed all feelings. Some people were
very apprehensive before but they became more
positive later. I also had team lunches with every

phase, but the contract required them to put some

people in the [design] phase.... [Corporate] wants
people who have done similar work for respectable
[logistics companies], some degree of cultural sensi-

team to thrash out issues. There was user resis-

tivity, because [corporate] knows that some of its

tance. I had to mediate between them to increase

people aren't easy to work with. (Vendor

the level of trust. (Subcontractor Manager)

Consultant)

Socialization functions such as soccer games, karaoke, and
Corporate management wanted more subcontractor consuldinners introduced: To foster team relationships, the
tants despite some concerns with their technical skills. Some
energetic and sociable AVP Logistics began encouraging
subcontractor consultants were new to enterprise systems
participation in group activities. He got people to socialize
configuration.
not just in a formal work context but also in informal "play"
settings. Recreational functions he organized included dinner
[Subcontractor, there 's] some concerns about their
sessions at posh restaurants to celebrate milestones achieved,
skill set. It is seen as part of the learning curve.
soccer games, and karaoke sessions.

Some are very green, and new to [enterprise
systems], some were doing [enterprise systems]
configuration for the first time. (Corporate IT

We learnt to karaoke. We 'd meet several times a

day , orchestrate, and after 5 p.m. go for drinks. I

Director)

play soccer with them and remind them to keep fit,

because the project is a long journey and people are

maxed out. (AVP Logistics)

The intentional replacement strategy led to subcontractor
consultants eventually accounting for about half the vendor

personnel.

Management demonstrated solidarity by banning own
long vacation leave: Corporate management also banned

long vacation leave. Long leave would only be allowed when It's more [subcontractor], less [primary vendor
now]. The team leads are all [subcontractor].
the project was on schedule. However, corporate manage(Corporate
IT Director)
ment did not exempt themselves from the ban and did not take
long leave while the project was in trouble. Thus, corporate
management projected an image of solidarity. Everyone The
in infusion of these consultants not only brought a higher
degree of shared cognition with BU representatives, but also
the project team was to suffer together, and no one (including
the controllers) was to take leave at the expense of others.facilitated the growth of productive consulting work norms.

Reappropriating Social Capital

Tactic: Leveraging the Clan

The above actions built the clan through the building of social
Import of social capital through a bigger team of sub-

contractor consultants: Given the tight project schedule,capital among team members. As social capital was built, the
project team began to develop new beliefs, values, and norms.
corporate management sought to bring in a bigger team of
subcontractor consultants who were more familiar with the

We observed controllers employing a distinct set of actions to
local context. Thus, social capital was also imported into the translate these relatively high-level and undirected shared
project team. These new consultants were stamped with the values, beliefs, and norms into the specific project context.
subcontractor's work norms (e.g., professionalism, strong task Relevant values or norms useful to project outcomes were

orientation); recall that the vendor's consultants were new to reinforced while undesirable ones were inhibited. Table 4
the vendor organization and the country and did not have a lists leveraging actions taken by controllers.

common work culture. In addition, some subcontractor
consultants had worked either with the organization or other From leaving on time to working late: During the initial

local companies previously. They were better able to relate project phases, the project norm was that controllees would
to BU representatives because of their familiarity with the leave the project site at the end of the official work day.
logistics industry and local context. The strategy here was to Working late was not a part of the logistics organization's
bring in a critical mass of subcontractor consultants so that corporate culture. Most of the primary vendor consultants
had been recently recruited from all over the world for this
their social capital could be used for the project.
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■

Clan Values and Controller Action to Influence Clan

Norms Values and Norms Clan Monitoring and Enforcement

Staying late at • Appoint subcontractor consultants as Primary vendor consul
work to meet track leads, increasing visibility of their and emulate subcontrac
deadlines behaviors (reinforce) behavior. Social capital increases visibility of "work
• Delay server backup to remove impedi- late" behavior, and sense of mutual support.
ment to emerging norm (reinforce)

Having an • Institute peer voting system (reinforce) BU team members now have a mechanism by w
enterprise they could negotiate with each other, and make tradeperspective offs. Social capital facilitates effective reciprocation
amongst team members.

• Designate joint user-consultant BU team members are accountable for the assigned
accountability for scenario (reinforce) scenario across all BUs, and spend more time on
understanding other BU's requirements to design a
common solution. They also see consultants as
partners. Social capital increases ability to interact
effectively with other BU team members and
consultants.

• Strict enforcement of scenario delivery Clear accountability empowers team members. This,

deadlines (inhibit) together with tight deadlines, weakens the previous
practice of frequently seeking approval from BU

management. Social capital increases commitment to
the project.

Being "one team" • Controller and vendor project manager The client-vendor distinction is less emphasized.
use informal chat sessions to strategize Social capital facilitates BU team members and

and to speak with one voice (reinforce) consultants give-and-take.

• Removing uncooperative consultants Corporate management, through active engagement
(inhibit) with project team members, can identify and remove
uncooperative consultants.

late.them
BU and
project, and the vendor did not have time to socialize
to corporate members could see the consultant
work
late,
its organizational culture. When brought into the
work
site,and also emulated their behavior.
they imitated the culture of the BU and corporate members.
For the first time , some people started working late ,

When the VP Logistics brought in the subcontractor
team
they
started working together. For the first time,
(importing social capital into the project), the subcontractor
there's the smell of success. (Primary Vendor
team brought with them their norm of working lateManager)
to meet
deadlines. When primary vendor track leads were replaced
with subcontractor track leads, the "work late" norm became
One impediment to the late work was the server backup time.

highly visible to primary vendor consultants
and
When
the BU
project norms were to leave at the end of the

members.

official work day, the server backup was timed to initiate at

the end of the work day. This tended to cause computers to
Primary vendor consultants knew the subcontractor had
freeze. Corporate management arranged for a later backup,
increased in favor, and that subcontractor team members were
thus removing an impediment to the promulgation of the
moving into positions of prominence. Primary vendor
consul"work late"
norm.
tants began emulating subcontractor consultants and stayed
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People are working 'til 8 or 9 p.m. ! I ashed for the

forming the voting would see each other on successive
occasions to vote on new processes. Thus, BU A would be

server backup to be delayed to midnight. (A VP
Logistics)

more willing to accommodate a noncritical process from BU

From BU-centric to enterprise perspective: Initially, BU

the design of a critical process of BU A that was not critical

members were highly BU centric. The affiliation to corporate

to BU B.

B with the trust that BU B would reciprocate by agreeing on

management was not strong. Reinforcing the initial BU-

centric focus was the practice of BU project members
referring back to their senior executives at the BU when
changes were required during analysis and design.

People were initially unwilling to change their
processes to benefit another [BU]. In such situations , [corporate] asked them to choose. If two
[BUs] agree, then it 's a blue box and the other [BU]

There was no empowerment. They have to check
with the boss, and get back to the [project] every
time. (Vendor Consultant)

will be a pink box. ... Now there 's greater readiness

Several clan building actions, such as grouping team members
by scenarios that cut across tracks and BUs, and having all
team members learn and use a common process modeling
language and tool, helped BU team members understand the

With the peer voting system, there was no need for arbitration

processes and requirements of other BUs and to appreciate the

were "punished," thus reinforcing peer norms toward conver-

bigger, enterprise-wide picture.

gence. The peer voting process propelled the project forward
by fostering consensus among the BUs that eventually saw
greater than 80 percent standardization.

Many people are only understanding now why the

to let go of their less critical requirements. (User
Representative)

by corporate management. BUs monitored and sanctioned
each other. The system provided a formal platform to con-

cretize peer sanctions, such that noncooperative behaviors

project is important; it's not only about transactional efficiency , but the project has strategic
value.... It began with the [BUs] wanting to change

Corporate management also changed the project accountability structure. Previously, the vendor consultants, as track

because their system was old. . . now it 's all changed.

leads, were responsible for getting processes standardized and

Someone said that if they truly have the system ,
they 'II be able to know how much it costs to run a

proach, corporate management took the opportunity to make

[fleet] of aircraft... how much it costs to support
[various aircraft-related activities] including non-

deliver a scenario.

issues resolved. With the change toward the scenario apconsultants and user representatives jointly responsible to

visible costs.... It's the power of information!

So now all three are involved, [corporate IT],
[consultant], and user, have to sign off on all

(Corporate Support)

This emergent enterprise-wide perspective was further
encouraged when corporate management introduced a peer
voting system. Process design variations from the different

documents. (Corporate IT Director)
The BU member responsible for a scenario thus had to work

scenarios were identified, and BU representatives would

closely with a consultant and a member of corporate IT. The

review and vote on them. A process that received support

BU member had to get requirements across the BUs, and thus

from at least two BUs was coded as "blue," which meant

spent less time interacting with his own BU.

corporate management would pay for its implementation. A
process that received only one vote would be coded as "pink,"

which meant the cost of implementing the process would
come from the BU's budget.
The peer voting system encouraged a shared enterprise orientation. It reinforced peer rewards and sanctions by establishing formal outcomes with direct business consequences.

Now with the scenarios approach, the users are
being shared across tracks. (Primary Vendor
Consultant)
Furthermore, each scenario was to be completed by a deadline. Thus, going back to the BU for approval was something
that became a luxury.

Because prior cross-BU contact was minimal, and BU
members were mainly rewarded for within-BU contributions,

BU members only had limited ability to socially sanction a
deviating BU member. With voting, however, people per-

At the beginning, everyone wanted their questions
answered. Now, there are strict time lines and
accountability. Scenario owners have a deadline for
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decisions; if they can 't make it, then it will escalate

toward positive project outcomes; such casual chats could

[to corporate]. (Corporate Support)

have steered clear of work-related matters. The consequence

was the AVP Logistics and vendor manager spoke about
Joint accountability changed norms by disrupting and
reforming peer monitoring networks. The BU member in
charge of a scenario interacted more with other BU members,

and less with his own BU. Because he was not solely
responsible for signing off on a scenario, his individual
accountability was lessened, reducing the possibility of BUspecific sanctions.
The user sits with the consultant to make sure that if

the scenario doesn 't go through , then both are to

blame. (Vendor Subcontractor Manager)
The joint accountability converted the sense of camaraderie

into real work efforts that accelerated project progress.
Members cooperated and willingly tapped the appropriate
user representative and/or consultant network to resolve a
process or technical issue. The trust and respect developed
between BU representatives and vendors translated into "give

and take" in facilitating user representative sign-offs. The
norms of cooperation and joint destiny were institutionalized,

as BU representatives and vendors embraced each others'
interests.

project issues with a consistent voice, sending a clear signal
from the top. While shared vision is generally important in
projects, it was especially salient here, because of a strong
norm of respect for authority in the organization and local

culture. Once senior management articulated the vision of
standardization with a joint and consistent voice, all groups

worked toward a common objective. For example, users
stopped blaming consultants for substandard documentation.

Instead, as a user representative noted, " Users began
amending the documents for the consultants ."

The shared norms of being "one team" had to be carefully
guarded and sustained. As the norm emerged, project team
members became less tolerant of the handful of consultants

perceived as being poor team players. BU members sanctioned such consultants by providing negative feedback about

them to corporate management. Corporate management
alerted vendor managers about these uncooperative consultants, and the vendor counseled and removed them when
necessary. These stern actions upheld the norms of being
cooperative, and one team.
Some consultants left because we asked them to. We

From identifying only with own stakeholder group to
being one team: When the project first began, the BU
members drew boundaries between what they perceived was
their work and what they felt was consultants' work. For

example, BU members frequently stated that it was the
consultants' job to come up with the design. This led to a
lack of pro-activeness and ownership by the BU members
with regard to the design of the new system.

Users are very vocal , but they 're not actual doers.

(Consultant)
Several clan-building actions were helpful in realigning BU
members and consultants from their respective groups to the

wanted them to leave because of their attitude
[ toward teamwork]. For example , the phrase "this
is your process " was regularly used by a consultant.

His indifference was unacceptable. Our people saw
the project as a team effort. (Corporate Support)

Resolution
Within three months, the project began to turn around. The

BU representatives and vendors worked together in greater
unison and were more willing to accommodate one another.
The results were a higher degree of standardization, more
integrated design, and speedier progress.

project team. For example, the soccer games, karaoke
sessions, and dinners helped both users and consultants

Momentum has improved. There 's ownership . . . also

interact in informal, nonwork settings. Subsequent steps were

helped things too. (Corporate IT Director)

taken to increase the sense of shared destiny, joint responsibility for and commitment to project success.

The designation of joint user-consultant accountability for

scenarios was one such measure. The AVP Logistics also
cleverly used the relationships he developed with the vendor
manager as both colleague and neighbor. The casual chats
during the car rides were converted into informal strategizing

sessions. These were proactive efforts to direct social capital

the people on the ground working together has

Although requirements analysis was completed two months
late, the momentum created ensured the project rolled out its
first implementation on schedule in April 2005. The original
target of 60 percent standardization in logistics processes
across the BUs was exceeded.

Earlier on, I didn 't want to over-sell standardization. The minimum was 60 percent, the figure in the
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contract. But I had hoped for 80-plus percent. In
the end, after we had gone through all processes in

means providing a common language and consistent reference

great detail, we delivered more than 80% stan-

perspective for effective communication and coordination.

dardization ! (A VP Logistics)

The abandonment of separate process modeling notations in

Team members began focusing on the success of the entire
project instead of just ensuring their own respective jobs got
done. For example, BU representatives helped during the
system integration test, a task that was earlier regarded as
being the sole responsibility of the vendor. The vendor and
subcontractor consultants, similarly, did " more than what they

were supposed to do ." When the warranty clause expired, the

subcontractor volunteered to stay on the project for another
three months without additional payment.

encouraging interaction. Building the cognitive dimension

favor of a new common process modeling notation created
words and meanings that helped stakeholders negotiate and
reconcile differences. Developing the relational dimension
means strengthening the relational bonds within the project

team. It goes beyond cordial social activities like dinners and
soccer games. In this project, much relationship building was

associated with the projection of management sincerity and

honesty. Corporate management led by example by subjecting itself to the same ban of long vacation leave as con-

trollees. Corporate management also encouraged controllees
to raise issues and took concrete steps to resolve difficulties.

We also saw how corporate management quickly built the
clan by reappropriating social capital from subcontractor

Discussion

consultants. The bulk import of consultants helped jump-start
This case examines how clan control was enacted in a com-

the work late norm. Our study thus demonstrates that social

capital can be imported from outside a project.
plex IT project within a few months. The team cooperation,
consensus, and commitment at project end were in stark
contrast to the initial state of self-interest, conflict, andOur case analysis further demonstrates that clan building
indifference. This section presents two critical findings fromefforts reinforce one another. For example, the effects of
our research: (1) how clan control can be enacted in an IT bringing in large numbers of subcontractor consultants (in
project, and (2) the role of formal authority in enabling clan
reappropriating social capital) were clearly accentuated by the
control.

physical collocation of users and consultants (with the
enhanced structural ties).

Enactment of Clan Control

Leveraging the Clan
Our case analysis suggests that, with proactive action, it is
possible to enact clan control within a few months, in We
large,
saw proactive actions by corporate management in
complex IT projects. Such enactment requires a targeted
leveraging the clan as they sought to influence the promulfocus on the dual process of building the clan - by developing
gation of project members' shared beliefs, values, and norms
its structural, cognitive, and relational dimensions or reapproto encourage project success. Corporate management wanted
priating existing social capital from elsewhere - and to
leverleverage the emergent work late, one team, and one enteraging the clan - by reinforcing project- facilitating norms
priseand
norms to drive project outcomes. Reinforcing actions
inhibiting those that impede the achievement of project employed
goals. by corporate management included the formal
Figure 2 presents the conceptual framework summarizing
our
appointment
of subcontractor consultants as track leads,
findings.
establishment of joint corporate-user-consultant responsibility, and institution of a peer voting system. Inhibiting
actions took the form of suppressing values and norms that
Building the Clan
might harm the project, such as in sanctioning and removing
Our case reveals targeted efforts of the controller, in partner-

ship with team members, to build the structural, cognitive,
and relational dimensions of social capital.

In this case, enhancing the structural dimension means
removing physical and organizational obstacles that impede
interactions. New work orientations (e.g., scenarios overlaying the tracks), knocking down walls, and the creation of
congregational space created a new working environment

noncooperative consultants or discouraging BU-centric
thinking. Corporate management was concerned that negative
attitudes could potentially damage emerging values and norms
that benefitted the project.

These actions to leverage norms required that social capital be

already present. The underlying structural, cognitive, and
relational ties enabled the quick propagation and enforcement
of such norms by enhancing the visibility of peer behaviors.
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In turn, visibility encouraged the imitation of peer behaviors.

The Role of Formal Authority

For example, consultants and users stayed late only after they

observed subcontractor consultants doing so. Similarly, the

Contrary to prior research which suggests that formal author-

identification of uncooperative members was typically not a
top-down decision. Such consultants were identified through

ity is the antithesis of clan control (Cardinal et al. 2004;
Gittell 2000), our analysis suggests that controllers as a

feedback from users.

formal authority play a critical role in enabling the enactment

In addition, without sufficient social capital, certain actions to

ways. First, it significantly accelerates the enactment of clan

of clan control. Formal authority appears to contribute in two

leverage the clan such as the peer voting system and joint

control by tapping its ready access to organizational power

corporate-user-consultant accountability could have degen-

and resources.

erated into finger-pointing, blame-shifting, and mutual
sabotage. These actions required the presence of strong social

capital so that users and vendors would cooperate and giveand-take. Finally, actions to leverage the clan were effective,
because enough project members were manifesting expected
norms. For example, enough consultants had to display a
norm of cooperation so that removing uncooperative consultants did not overly compromise project staffing.

• Figure of Authority. In enacting clan control, controllers exerted substantial organizational power. Where
necessary, they employed power stemming directly from

their position in the organizational hierarchy to define
and monitor desired project outcomes. In facilitating the
building and leveraging of the clan, for example, corpor-

ate management had the power to bring in a subcontractor team, to mandate use of the common modeling

Perhaps the most striking example that leveraging the clan for

control requires existing social capital is the failure of the
initial clan controls. The memorandum of understanding did
not create a norm of cooperation, because personnel in the

language, and to remove uncooperative project members.

• Symbol. Controllers' roles as symbols facilitated certain

kinds of social capital building. For example, soccer

logistics organization and vendor had few existing ties to each

games, karaoke sessions, and dinners were successful, in

other then. The speech by the CEO failed to create a commit-

part, because corporate management personally invited

ment to standardization, because users were skeptical of

people to attend. Controllees would have been less

project goals and of each other. Thus, attempts to leverage

willing to attend had they been invited by another con-

the clan without strong social capital are likely to yield

trollee, because participation might signal a desire to
avoid work. That corporate management invited con-

ineffective clan control.
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trollees demonstrated that participation in functions was

acceptable behavior.

Resourcing/Approval. Finally, many social capital
building mechanisms required organizational support and
would not have worked without controller involvement.

For example, the re-architecting of rooms and workshops

were suggested by various consultants (i.e., it emerged
from the clan). However, consultants did not have the
resources or power to re-architect rooms or encourage
user representatives to attend workshops, and needed
corporate management's power to enact their proposals.
The second way formal authority contributes to the enactment

of clan control relates to the public goods aspect of social
capital. Coleman (1988) noted that
the kinds of social structures that make possible
social norms and the sanctions that enforce them do

not benefit primarily the persons whose efforts
would be necessary to bring them about, but benefit

all those who are part of such a structure (p. SI 16).

ties among members. Similarly, the peer voting system was
a formal (outcome) control mechanism that accentuated clan
norms of enterprise orientation. Thus, mindfully employed,
formal control can amplify clan control. When well-aligned
with the shared norms, beliefs, and values of the clan, the

simultaneous deployment of both formal and clan control
need not be a zero-sum game.

Contributions to Behavioral Control Theory
Our research refines and enriches behavioral control theory in

three ways. First, it reconciles the differing views on clan
control. Prior literature on clan control has approached it
from two perspectives, (1) that clan control leverages on an
existing clan to control (Jaworski 1988; Jaworski et al. 1993;
Kohli and Kettinger 2004), and (2) clan control concerns the
building of the clan (Choudhury and Sabherwal 2003; Rowe
and Wright 1997). Our study reconciles these two perspectives by demonstrating that clan control requires both the
building and leveraging of the clan to succeed. In doing so,
it also helps to explain why social capital is important to clan
control, going beyond recent research that has already demon-

As benefits cannot be restricted to specific persons, there is a

strated a strong link between the two constructs (Kirsch et al.

tendency to underinvest in building social capital. State

2010). Social capital is necessary for building the clan, and

intervention is often necessary to produce this "public good."
This is especially true during early stages of social capital
development where shared norms are not established. Formal

without social capital in place, leveraging the clan is
impossible.

authority serves as a guarantor, ensuring integrity in the
socialization process. Formal authority can establish expectations of acceptable clan behaviors, reducing the need for
lengthy relational exploration to build trust in the social

Our second contribution is explaining the role of controllers
in enacting clan control. Prior literature tends to emphasize
the role of peer enforcement of norms in clan control. For

system. Formal authority provides safeguards to ensure

enforced by group members as each strives to be "a regular

fairness and reciprocity in the socialization process before real
trust in the social system develops. In our case, such acts as
making user-vendor pairings accountable for a scenario and
establishing a voting system for business processes helped
establish rules for engagement between clan members.

Sabherwal (2003), similarly, note that in clan control "each
member effectively functions as both controller and controllee" (p. 292). They do not explain how controllers employ
peer monitoring and sanctions to control. Our study high-

example, Kirsch et al. (2002) noted that clan control is

member of the project team" (p. 494). Choudhury and

lights that controllers play an instrumental role in employing

significant resources and authority to influence the building
and leveraging of the clan. The social capital perspective in
clan
control helps make a stronger distinction between conand coercive bureaucracies in organizations. Their work
notes how formal structures and procedures can develop the trollers and controllees. Our conceptualization recognizes not
fabric of informal cooperation. Likewise, Evans (1996) sug- only the peer aspect (e.g., peer sanctions, rewards, norm creagests that state involvement can buttress rather than under- tion), but also the controller aspect of clan control (i.e., by
building social capital and leveraging norms, values, and
mine social capital in civil society. We find controllers play
beliefs developed by peers). Recognizing the role of conan instrumental role in enacting clan control. They have
trollers aligns the enactment of clan control more consistently
access to significant resources (including formal control) to
with the underlying principal-agency perspective of behavbuild and leverage the clan. In our case, formal control was
ioral control theory (Eisenhardt 1985, 1989a).
deployed to build shared structure, cognition, and relation-

Our observations are thus consistent with prior research by
Adler and Borys (1996) who distinguish between enabling

ships to facilitate the development of clan control or to
reinforce/inhibit clan norms. For example, the imposition of Our third contribution lies in clarifying the relationship
a common modeling language was a formal (behavioral) between formal and clan control (Choudhury and Sabherwal
control mechanism that facilitated the building of cognitive

2003; Kirsch 1997). Prior research suggests these controls
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may be complementary, but has not revealed how and why
(Grabski and Leech 2007; Grabski et al. 2002). Our research

the causal relationship between clan control and project suc-

reveals that controllers have access to substantial resources

non-clan control related factors during our analysis maintains

cess (Henderson and Lee 1992). We argue that suspending

(including control resources such as formal controls), andthe simplicity of our conceptual framework without sacrisuch controls can be used not only to drive controllees towardficing its ability to make sense of clan control processes.
Future studies could examine how non-clan control related
project outcomes, but also to develop other controls. Mindfully employed, formal controls can build shared structure,
factors regulate project turnaround processes.
cognition, and relationships to facilitate the development of
clan control or to reinforce/inhibit clan norms. Our research
The Asian context of this study must also be considered in
thus partly clarifies how clan and formal control can work assessing the generalizability of findings. While we believe

together in a portfolio; one strategy is to employ one form of

our model of clan control enactment is applicable to all

control to build the other.

contexts, the specific actions in building or leveraging the
clan are likely to vary. For example, whereas relational ties
were built through various social activities, including karaoke,

Conclusion and Future Research ■■■■

in Sweden, such clan building practices are likely to revolve
around fika , or the coffee break.

This research sets out to explore how clan control can be
We also acknowledge that in large, complex projects, there
enacted in IT projects. To answer this question, this research
are likely to be multiple control dyads (Soh et al. 201 1). We
had to simultaneously answer the question "what is clan confocus this paper on the highest level control dyad within the
trol?" Through a longitudinal study of a large enterprise sysproject, between the corporate project management team, and
tem project, we discover that clan control requires strong
all other team members, as our primary objective was to
social capital. Social capital in its structural, cognitive, and
examine how the main project controllers facilitated the
relational dimensions facilitates the emergence of norms. The
enactment of clan control across the project team as a whole.
controller's role in clan control is to build and reappropriate
Future studies should examine the interactions across multiple
social capital, and to reinforce norms that benefit a project,
control dyads within large, multistakeholder projects.
while inhibiting norms detrimental to it. Our study not only
sharpens the conceptual clarity of clan control, it also bears
Finally, our study focuses on the successful deployment of
strong implications for practice. It adds a strategic and interclan control alongside formal control. However, other studies
ventionist orientation to accelerate the enactment of clan
have documented organizations that willingly cede clan concontrol by suggesting specific ways to build and leverage the
trol to obtain formal control. The factors that encourage
clan. The need for proactive intervention is becoming
tradeoffs versus complementarity between both kinds of
increasingly important as businesses initiate larger and more
controls need to be further explored.
complex IT projects for which enactments of clan control will

be crucial.

Several limitations of our study should be addressed by future

research. Our study focuses on how clan control can be
enabled within a short time frame. We elaborate how it is
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